CMC might be liable to William, William Junior, and Gus for making a defective product design. CMC might argue that they already fulfilled their duty to warn, which the three ignored, so they knowingly did something culpable and therefore assume some liability. After all, if you make CMC strictly liable, then they might be forced to stop making these bikes and shut down, which might be bad since these bikes do cause positive externalities in producing fun. You might even argue that they are a public good in the sense that they bring people together, as with William and his son. But that is precisely the problem: we don't want William's son to be riding these bikes, and it is known, reasonably foreseeable, to CMC that minors will ride the bikes because they are so attractive. In that sense, they are almost intentionally putting a product out there that will harm people, and so we should hold them strictly liable. After all, if the public good truly outweighs the cost, then we want CMC to properly weigh the cost, which it seems they haven't done in this case anyway because the bikes are so cheap. If it's a small thing that CMC can do to up safety, then we want strict liability, per Learned Hand, especially since they have the last clear chance to fix the product. But in this case, it seems that the product itself is defective in design in being so low to the ground so that we want strict liability just to force CMC to stop creating the product altogether.
William might be liable to William Jr. (through the proxy of Jr.'s mom, William's ex-wife) for not fulfilling his duty to his son in their special relationship not to expose him negligently to danger. William's defense might be that there should be immunity for parents, as parents expose their children to danger a lot and courts wouldn't be the best place to deal with the flood of cases that would ensue if immunity for parents was not the case. But William could reasonably foresee that in this case, he had a greater duty to protect his son after reading the warnings. His son could not know any better and so too easily consented, a la Hudson v. Craft, to what William knew was a dangerous and adult activity.
William might be more directly liable to his ex-wife for causing negligent infliction of emotional distress. It could be argued, although this is a bad argument, that it was foreseeable to William that the injury to Jr. would happen based on his conduct and that his mother, of course, would be massively upset. If we follow the reasoning of Dillon v. Legg, then the mother should recover because she's closely enough related. However, courts (even in California, in the Thing case) have stopped expanding recovery for cases like this because ultimately the line is too hard to draw and tort law may not be the best avenue to remedy these sorts of situations.
Paula might be liable to Gus since she licensed his playing in her lot, which she knew was a possible attractive nuisance. It might be reasonably foreseeable to her that such an injury was bound to occur with kids and racing. Perhaps she had an active duty to warn to chase out trespassers and therefore incur no liability. But it seems likely that the court might find the intervening steps to Gus's injury too attenuated to hold Paula liable.
The pick-up truck driver might be liable to William and William Jr. since his "swerve" indicated negligent driving. His defense would be that they were disobeying the statute, which was made precisely to prevent the harm that ultimately occurred. The truck driver may not have been precisely within the bounds of what a reasonable person would have done in his situation by swerving, but it was not foreseeable that his swerve would cause the type of harm that happened.
Paula knows some of kids use the lot, and she knows that William uses it, but does she know Gus uses it? If she does, than he is a licensee, and Paula must warn him of special dangers. None seem to exist, at least not in relation to Gus's injury. If Gus didn't explicitly have Paula's consent to use the property, he is a trespasser, but of a special breed: the kind that Paula knows is going to use the land. For these trespassers, the owner must either use reasonable care to make the place safe or warn of dangers. In either case, I think Paula gets off.
2 comments:
CMC might be liable to William, William Junior, and Gus for making a defective product design. CMC might argue that they already fulfilled their duty to warn, which the three ignored, so they knowingly did something culpable and therefore assume some liability. After all, if you make CMC strictly liable, then they might be forced to stop making these bikes and shut down, which might be bad since these bikes do cause positive externalities in producing fun. You might even argue that they are a public good in the sense that they bring people together, as with William and his son. But that is precisely the problem: we don't want William's son to be riding these bikes, and it is known, reasonably foreseeable, to CMC that minors will ride the bikes because they are so attractive. In that sense, they are almost intentionally putting a product out there that will harm people, and so we should hold them strictly liable. After all, if the public good truly outweighs the cost, then we want CMC to properly weigh the cost, which it seems they haven't done in this case anyway because the bikes are so cheap. If it's a small thing that CMC can do to up safety, then we want strict liability, per Learned Hand, especially since they have the last clear chance to fix the product. But in this case, it seems that the product itself is defective in design in being so low to the ground so that we want strict liability just to force CMC to stop creating the product altogether.
William might be liable to William Jr. (through the proxy of Jr.'s mom, William's ex-wife) for not fulfilling his duty to his son in their special relationship not to expose him negligently to danger. William's defense might be that there should be immunity for parents, as parents expose their children to danger a lot and courts wouldn't be the best place to deal with the flood of cases that would ensue if immunity for parents was not the case. But William could reasonably foresee that in this case, he had a greater duty to protect his son after reading the warnings. His son could not know any better and so too easily consented, a la Hudson v. Craft, to what William knew was a dangerous and adult activity.
William might be more directly liable to his ex-wife for causing negligent infliction of emotional distress. It could be argued, although this is a bad argument, that it was foreseeable to William that the injury to Jr. would happen based on his conduct and that his mother, of course, would be massively upset. If we follow the reasoning of Dillon v. Legg, then the mother should recover because she's closely enough related. However, courts (even in California, in the Thing case) have stopped expanding recovery for cases like this because ultimately the line is too hard to draw and tort law may not be the best avenue to remedy these sorts of situations.
Paula might be liable to Gus since she licensed his playing in her lot, which she knew was a possible attractive nuisance. It might be reasonably foreseeable to her that such an injury was bound to occur with kids and racing. Perhaps she had an active duty to warn to chase out trespassers and therefore incur no liability. But it seems likely that the court might find the intervening steps to Gus's injury too attenuated to hold Paula liable.
The pick-up truck driver might be liable to William and William Jr. since his "swerve" indicated negligent driving. His defense would be that they were disobeying the statute, which was made precisely to prevent the harm that ultimately occurred. The truck driver may not have been precisely within the bounds of what a reasonable person would have done in his situation by swerving, but it was not foreseeable that his swerve would cause the type of harm that happened.
Quick note on my girl Paula:
Paula knows some of kids use the lot, and she knows that William uses it, but does she know Gus uses it? If she does, than he is a licensee, and Paula must warn him of special dangers. None seem to exist, at least not in relation to Gus's injury. If Gus didn't explicitly have Paula's consent to use the property, he is a trespasser, but of a special breed: the kind that Paula knows is going to use the land. For these trespassers, the owner must either use reasonable care to make the place safe or warn of dangers.
In either case, I think Paula gets off.
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